When does group norm or group identity predict cooperation in a public goods dilemma? The moderating effects of idiocentrism and allocentrism by Chen, Xiao-Ping et al.
RUNNING HEAD: Group Norm, Identity and Cooperation 
 
 
 
When Does Group Norm or Group Identity Predict Cooperation  
in a Public Goods Dilemma?  The Moderating Effects of Idiocentrism and Allocentrism 
 
 
 
Xiao-Ping Chen 
Department of Management and Organization 
University of Washington 
Box 353200 
Seattle, WA 98195-3200 
E-mail: xpchen@u.washington.edu 
 
 
S. Arzu Wasti 
The Graduate School of Management 
Sabanci University 
Orhanli 34956 Tuzla 
Istanbul, Turkey 
Tel: +90 (216) 483-962 
Fax: +90 (216) 483-9699 
E-mail: awasti@sabanciuniv.edu 
 
 
Harry C. Triandis 
Department of Psychology 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Champaign, IL 61820 
E-mail: htraindi@s.psych.uiuc.edu 
 
 
 
An earlier version of the paper has been presented on the Inaugural Conference of the Asia 
Academy of Management in December 1998, Hong Kong. Correspondence should be 
addressed to S. Arzu Wasti, Graduate School of Management, Sabanci University, Orhanli 
34956 Tuzla or via e-mail awasti@sabanciuniv.edu 
 2
 
 
Abstract 
In this study we examined how perceived group norm and group identity influence 
individual cooperative behavior in a public goods dilemma across cultural settings.  Six 
hundred and eight students in the United States and People’s Republic of China participated 
in a laboratory experiment in which group norm and group identity were manipulated and 
the individual cultural orientations of idiocentrism and allocentrism were measured.  We 
found that idiocentrism and allocentrism moderated the relationship between perceived 
group norm and cooperation but not between group identity and cooperation.  In particular, 
members who endorsed allocentrism to a greater extent cooperated more when they 
perceived a more cooperative group norm than did members who endorsed lower levels of 
allocentrism.  On the other hand, people scored high on idiocentrism cooperated less when 
perceiving a more cooperative norm than did people scored low on idiocentrism.  The 
results suggest that allocentrics are not cooperative in every context but are rather highly 
sensitive to social cues whereas idiocentrics, while tending to behave in a way that 
maximizes personal outcomes at the expense of the group, are also somewhat aloof to the 
situation.   
KEYWORDS: Group norm, group identity, culture, cooperation, social dilemma 
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When Does Group Norm or Group Identity Predict Cooperation in a Public Goods 
Dilemma?  The Moderating Effects of Idiocentrism and Allocentrism 
1. Introduction 
A social dilemma is a situation in which two or more persons receive a higher 
payoff for a non-cooperative choice (defection) than for a cooperative choice—no matter 
what the other members choose—but all members are better off if all cooperate than if all 
defect (Dawes, 1980).  One type of social dilemma is what Olson (1965) referred to as a 
“public goods dilemma”.  A public good is a commodity that can be provided only if group 
members contribute something towards its provision; however all persons−contributors and 
non-contributors−may use it (Komorita & Parks, 1995).  The problem of the provision of 
public goods has attracted the attention of a number of scholars because of an interesting 
dilemma− individually rational/reasonable behavior by every person in a collective could 
lead everyone in the collective to be worse off than if they had adopted some other 
behavior.  For example, if a project team member decides to contribute little time, effort 
and resources to a project while most of the other members choose to work as hard as they 
could to make it a success, this member can enjoy the benefits associated with the success 
of the project at minimal cost.  However, if everyone acts in this manner, no contribution 
would be made and there would be no successful projects − a situation where everyone is 
worse off than if the public good were available.  Thus, it is important to understand the 
processes through which members make their cooperative decisions. 
 The effectiveness of communication, especially face-to-face discussion, in cooperation 
induction has been a robust finding in social dilemma research (e.g., Dawes, McTavish, & 
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Shaklee, 1977; van de Kragt, Orbell, & Dawes, 1983).  Among the many hypotheses proposed 
to explain this effect, the group identity hypothesis has been most compelling (Brewer & 
Kramer, 1986; Dawes, Orbell, & van de Kragt, 1988; Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1990; 
Kramer, 1993).  Group identity can be defined as members’ positive attitudes toward their 
group (Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone & Crook, 1989), which includes cognitive, affective, 
and behavioral components.  The group identity hypothesis states that group discussion 
promotes members’ identity (or positive attitudes) toward the group, or a substitution of group 
regard for individual concern (Messick & Brewer, 1983), which increases group members’ 
cooperative behavior. Brewer and Kramer (1986) and Kramer and Brewer (1984) used a 
"common fate" manipulation for group identity and found that people who shared “common 
fate” were more willing to cooperate.  Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell (1990), after 
reviewing the series of studies they conducted during the past ten or more years, concluded 
that "with no discussion, egoistic motives explain cooperation; with discussion, group identity-
-alone or in interaction with verbal promises--explains its dramatic increase" (p.109).   
 An alternative explanation that received much less attention, however, was the 
normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) that might have been generated during group 
discussion of the social dilemma.  In other words, communication might have been used as a 
channel to convey information about group norms and values (Kramer, 1989), and the 
perception of such social norms may have had a direct impact on members' behavior. Social 
norms are commonly considered legitimate and socially shared guidelines to accepted and 
expected behavior (Birenbaum & Sagarin, 1976).  Although the group norm hypothesis has 
been used to explain base cooperation rates, to provide post-hoc explanations for cooperation, 
or as just another source of error variance, it has rarely been the direct focus of the social 
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dilemma research (except for Bonacich, 1972 and Pillutla & Chen, 1999).   
 One of the reasons for the apparent disinterest in norms, according to Kerr's (1992) 
analysis, is "the theoretical and methodological traditions from which social dilemma research 
sprang" (p.34).  The initial interest in social dilemmas was aroused by game theorists and 
economists who tended to preclude consideration of social reward systems (e.g., Homans, 
1950; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Another reason is that "norms may 
be viewed as important but uninteresting factors in social dilemma behavior" (Kerr, 1992, 
p.35).  As Davis (1971) has noted, we tend to view findings that contradict our basic 
assumptions as implausible, and results that are fully consistent with those basic assumptions 
as uninteresting and obvious. The effect of norms seems to fall in the latter category, namely, 
norms guide individual behavior, so finding people behave consistently with what the social 
norm would suggest is not interesting.   
 An alternative reason that we offer to explain the disinterest in the influence of norms 
in mainstream social dilemma research is related to cultural influence. The majority of social 
dilemma studies are conducted in the Western cultural contexts where both the researcher and 
the participant hold more individualistic cultural values—values that emphasize independence, 
individual goals, and self-reliance (Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Triandis, 1995). While both social 
norms and individual attitudes are important determinants of behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980), research from cross-cultural psychology suggests that in an individualistic culture, 
people’s behavior is more likely to be driven by their own attitudes rather than norms 
(Bontempo & Rivero, 1992; Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998; Triandis, 1995). This may 
explain why group identity (members’ attitude toward the group) became the dominant 
explanation of the communication effect and why more studies have been conducted to test 
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the group identity hypothesis rather than the group norm hypothesis.  In the present study, we 
will examine how individual cultural orientations moderate the effect of group norm and 
group identity on individual cooperative decision-making in a public goods dilemma. 
1.1 Individual Cultural Orientation 
 Individual cultural orientation refers to an individual’s cultural values independent of 
the dominant cultural orientation of the society in which he/she resides. Whereas 
individualism and collectivism represent the general attributes of a given culture, the terms 
“idiocentrism” and “allocentrism” have been used to measure the individual-level orientations 
that reflect these cultural values (Triandis, 1989).  Idiocentrics view the self as being separate 
from others, are concerned with personal achievement, and give priority to personal goals over 
the goals of collectives.  Conversely, allocentrics view the self as embedded in social contexts.  
They are concerned with interpersonal harmony so that when they make distinctions between 
personal and collective goals they subordinate their personal goals to the collective goals.  
From the individual perspective, according to Triandis and his colleagues, idiocentrism and 
allocentrism are distinct constructs measurable along a normal distribution (Triandis, Leung, 
Villareal, & Clack, 1985).  Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier’s (2002) meta-analysis of 
individualism-collectivism (or idiocentrism and allocentrism at the individual level) studies in 
the past two decades supports the notion that idiocentrism and allocentrism are not two ends of 
a single continuum but two distinct dimensions.  Common societal influences tend to make 
one of these two dimensions higher on average in any particular societal culture; however, 
individuals often differ from their society’s trends. In this study, we adopt an individual-level 
approach to culture and assume that individual cultural orientations are internalized cognitive 
structures that could guide choices by evoking a sense of basic principles of right and wrong, 
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as well as priorities, such as personal achievement vs. collective good (Oyserman et al., 2002).  
In particular, we study how these individual cultural orientations interact with group norm, or 
with group identity, in determining cooperative behaviors in a public goods dilemma.  
1.1.1 Group Norm, Idiocentrism, Allocentrism, and Cooperation  
 There are many definitions of group/social norms. One definition is that social 
norms are guides for human conduct that are accepted and expected in a given situation at a 
given time (Birenbaum & Sagarin, 1976).  Another view of social norms focuses on the 
sense-making role they play.  For example, Raven and Rubin (1976) suggest that norms 
provide order and meaning to what otherwise might be seen as an ambiguous, uncertain, or 
perhaps threatening situation.  One source of such sense making norms is the behavior or 
the expected behavior of others in the situation, because others’ behavioral patterns indicate 
what is appropriate and not appropriate in the situation.  These two different views of 
norms lead to the distinction made between norms (e.g., Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; 
Pillutla & Chen, 1999).  One distinction is the implicit vs. perceived norms (Pillutla & 
Chen, 1999). Implicit norms refer to the behavioral expectations of what one ought to do in 
a given context, for example, cooperation in social spheres of life but competition in 
economic spheres of life.  Perceived norms, on the other hand, refer to the observed 
(already observed or expect to be observed) behavioral patterns from others in a given 
context.  Implicit norms and perceived norms sometimes could be in conflict, such as 
observing strong competition in an event that is primarily socially oriented, or observing 
cooperation in economic settings.  Pillutla and Chen (1999) found that the perceived norm 
was more important than the implicit norm in determining cooperation when these two 
norms were inconsistent, especially in situations where implicit norm suggested 
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cooperation but perceived norm revealed competition, in which case cooperation dropped 
dramatically.  In this study, we focus on the perceived group norms and define it as 
member’s perceptions of majority others’ expected behavior in a given situation. 
People generally conform to the norms (be it implicit or perceived norm) of their 
groups for many reasons.  There are two main explanations for such conformity (Insko, 
1985).  First, people want to be right.  It has been inculcated in them, sometimes from 
earliest childhood, that norms are the right and proper ways.  Second, people want to get 
social approval or acceptance.  Following what the majority does or what the norm would 
suggest reduces the risk of being excluded from the group.  On the other hand, we also 
observe non-conformative behaviors (deviant behaviors that are not illegal).  For example, 
people dress casually in a formal job interview, or do not come to meetings that all 
members are expected to attend.  There are also many social explanations for the 
prevalence of non-conformative behaviors.  For one thing, at least in individualistic cultures 
such as the United States, being unique and different are highly valued (Oyserman et al., 
2002; Triandis, 1995).  Second, it is possible that the specific rewards (monetary) for non-
conformative behaviors may be greater than that for conformative behaviors.  In the public 
goods dilemma, for instance, a conformative behavior to cooperative group norms will 
result in a lower amount of monetary payoff for the conforming individual than will a non-
conformative behavior.  In such situations, a conformative behavior blocks the individual 
member to achieve his personal goal of financial success, although fulfills his desire of 
getting social approval.  Therefore, whether a person values individual achievement or 
interpersonal harmony will largely determine which course of action one would choose.  
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Since allocentrics are concerned with interpersonal harmony and fitting in the 
group, they are more likely to use social cues for appropriate behavior.  Research using the 
priming technique in evoking participants’ self-construal has found that when primed with 
independence versus interdependence, participants differ in their memory and information 
processing style.  Specifically, interdependence priming increases sensitivity to contextual 
information, and these differences parallel those found when contrasting the responses of 
Chinese (more interdependent) and German (more independent) participants (Haberstroh, 
Oyserman, Schwarz, & Kühnen, 2002). These results suggest that allocentrics pay more 
attention to group norms and are more likely to use them in guiding their behavior.   
On the other hand, when idiocentrics perceive a cooperative group norm, they are 
more likely to examine the costs and benefits associated with conforming to the norm.  If 
conforming to the norm helps to achieve their individual goal of financial success, it is 
likely that they will behave consistently with the perceived norm.  If doing so does not help 
achieving individual goal, it is likely that they will not behave consistently with the norm.  
In the public goods dilemma, when idiocentrics perceive that other group members are 
contributing to the public good, it is likely that they will view it as a good opportunity to 
take advantage and maximize their personal gain.  Therefore, we hypothesized 
H1a: Allocentrism will moderate the effect of group norm on cooperation such 
that more allocentric persons will be more likely to cooperate when they perceive a more 
cooperative group norm than will less allocentric persons, and  
H1b:  Idiocentrism will moderate the effect of cooperative group norm on 
cooperation such that more idiocentric persons will be less likely to cooperate when they 
perceive a more cooperative group norm than will less idiocentric persons.  
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1.1.2 Group Identity, Idiocentrism, Allocentrism, and Cooperation 
Group identity is defined as members’ attitude toward the group that consists of 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral components (Hinkle et al., 1989).  Over the last two 
decades, social dilemma research has demonstrated the positive effect of group identity on 
people’s willingness to contribute toward their collective welfare (Dawes et al., 1988, 1990; 
Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Kramer & Goldman, 1995).  One explanation for this effect is that 
strengthening group identity increases the value people attach to the group’s welfare vs. 
their personal welfare (De Cremer & van Vugt, 1999; Kramer & Goldman, 1995).  Studies 
examining the moderating influence of social value orientation on the effect of group 
identity (e.g., Liebrand & McClintock, 1998; van Lange & Kuhlman, 1990) have shown 
that the decisions of proselfs (i.e., competitors, people who want to maximize the difference 
between their own and others’ outcomes, and individualists, people who want to maximize 
their own outcome, regardless of others’ outcome) are more likely to be affected by group 
identity (De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002; Kramer & Goldman, 1995).  When group identity is 
strong, their motives are transformed from the personal to the group level, thereby 
increasing cooperation. Because the core values held by the proselfs and by the idiocentrics 
are similar, there might be a moderating effect of idiocentrism on the relationship between 
group identity and cooperation.  However there has not been any empirical work examining 
such moderating effect.   
As we discussed earlier, for idiocentrics attitudes are their main determinants of 
social behavior (Bontempo & Rivero, 1992).  In the public goods dilemma context, it 
implies that idiocentrics will be more likely to cooperate if they have a more positive 
attitude toward their group.  Moreover, high group identification may change how 
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idiocentrics define self-interest, they are likely to be motivated to turn a collective payoff 
into a more personal one.  Therefore, the higher the idiocentrics identify with the group, the 
more likely they will contribute to the public good.  On the other hand, in the public goods 
dilemma context, members’ attitudes toward their group (or group identity) are not likely 
determinants of cooperation for allocentrics. Therefore, 
H2: Idiocentrism will moderate the relationship between group identity and 
cooperation such that more idiocentric persons will be more likely to cooperate when they 
have higher levels of group identity than will less idiocentric persons.  
2. Method 
2.1 Participants   
Participants were 608 undergraduate students (292 Americans from a university in the 
Midwest of the US and 316 Chinese from a university in the Midwest of PRC) who 
voluntarily signed up for the experiment.  A total of 151 one 4-person groups were formed.  
All participants received monetary payment for their participation contingent upon the 
experimental conditions, as well as their performance in the experiment. 
2.2 Experimental Task   
 An experimental paradigm that has been used to study the public goods dilemma is an 
adaptation of Marwell and Ames’ (1979) public goods simulation (e.g., Chen, 1996; 
Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992).  Accordingly, participants were asked to play the role of a 
member of a four-person work group and make a decision in a hypothetical work 
environment. Each participant was given 10 free hours over the weekend and each hour was 
worth $1 (1RMB in PRC).  Participants were informed that there was a large customer 
demand for product A and that they had to work extra hours to meet this demand.  They were 
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asked to decide how many extra hours (from 0 to 10) they would like to put into work over the 
weekend. Specifically, they were told that (1) the hours they kept for themselves (P-account) 
would keep their original value and this value would belong to themselves, (2) the hours they 
allocated to the group task (J-account) would double in their value but it would be equally 
distributed among all group members, regardless of the number of hours each member 
actually put into the group task, and (3) their individual payoff would be the sum the hours in 
the P-account and their equal share from the J-account.  Table 1 presents the payoff matrix for 
this simulation.  It can be seen that investing $0 to the J-account yields higher payoffs no 
matter what the other members do.  But if everyone contributes $0, each receives $10, which 
is less than $20 if everyone contributes $10 to the J-account. Three examples were given as 
illustrations of this pay system. 
------ Insert Table 1 about here ----- 
2.3 Design and Procedure 
 2.3.1 Design.  In this study, we attempted to create different levels of cooperative 
group norm, group identity, and idiocentrism and allocentrism in a laboratory experiment 
through the manipulation of three factors. Specifically, we conducted the experiment in both 
the United States (US) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) to create a large variance of 
idiocentrism and allocentrism among participants because the findings from Hofstede's (1980) 
large scale survey of beliefs and values suggest that at the cultural level, the US is high on 
individualism, whereas countries having populations of Chinese background (e.g., Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Singapore) are high on collectivism.  The results from Oyserman et al.’s 
(2002) meta-analysis again confirmed this observation.   
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 The familiarity factor was manipulated by asking participants to bring their familiar 
others/friends to the lab or by randomly assigning participants into groups.  This manipulation 
would create variance in members’ attitude toward the group because groups consisting of 
familiar others are more likely to have more positive attitudes toward one another than are 
groups consisting of randomly assigned members.  This manipulation would also create 
variance in members’ perception of a cooperative group norm because more familiarity could 
evoke expectations of more cooperative behaviors from other members. 
Another factor we manipulated in our experiment was whether to let group 
members have a warm-up interaction before they make their individual decision or not.  
The purpose of this manipulation was again to create more variance among participants in 
terms of their levels of group identity.  Previous studies (e.g., Bouas & Komorita, 1996) 
have shown that members who had warm-up interactions (e.g., group discussion on a non-
social dilemma issue) had more positive attitudes toward their group than those who did not 
have such interaction, which would suggest that a group of randomly assigned members 
who have the warm-up interaction will have more positive attitudes toward their group than 
a group of randomly assigned members who have no interaction at all.  This way, we were 
able to create different levels of group identity even within groups consisting of non-
familiar members, and the same for perceptions of a cooperative group norm. 
 2.3.2 Procedure.  At the beginning of the experiment, all participants were given six 
"wilderness survival" problems to read and think about. Participants in the Warm-up 
Interaction condition were then asked to discuss these problems with one another and reach 
consensus about the solutions.  Participants in the No-Warm-up Interaction condition, on the 
other hand, were asked to solve these problems individually.  After all the problems were 
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solved, participants in both conditions were given the Group Identification Scale (GIS: Hinkle, 
et al., 1989).  Following the completion of the GIS, they were presented with the experimental 
task described above (also read aloud by the experimenter) and asked to make a decision 
individually and anonymously as to how many hours (0 to 10) they would like to work over 
the weekend.  To make sure that all understood the task, a short quiz (with a full debriefing) 
was given before the decision-making.   
 After collecting their decisions but before giving them feedback about other members’ 
decisions, participants were asked to fill out two questionnaires (one at a time). The first 
questionnaire included group norm related questions.  The second questionnaire was the 
INDCOL (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk & Gelfand, 1995), for measuring individual cultural 
orientations.  After participants finished all the questionnaires, they were given feedback about 
each member’s decision and their own payoffs.  They were then thanked, debriefed, paid and 
dismissed individually.  The whole experiment lasted about 50 minutes and participants 
received an average of $15 in US and RMB15 in PRC. 
2.4 Measures 
 2.4.1 Cultural Orientation.  Singelis et al.’s (1995) 32-item INDCOL was used to 
measure individual cultural orientation.  Although this scale was originally designed to 
measure four types of cultural orientations—horizontal and vertical individualism and 
horizontal and vertical collectivism, based on the validation studies (Triandis & Gelfand, 
1998) we combined the two collectivism subscales to measure allocentrism and used the 
horizontal individualism scale as an indicator of idiocentrism.  Indeed, the meta-analytic 
evidence by Oyserman et al. (2002) also indicated that the two collectivism subscales in 
Singelis et al.’s (1995) instrument were correlated, and that the two individualism subscales 
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were orthogonal, with the content of the vertical individualism subscale unrelated to the core 
element of idiocentrism. Our decision was further supported by confirmatory factor analysis as 
well as item-scale statistics, which showed that in both samples the two latent collectivism 
factors were highly correlated (ranging from Φ = .63 to Φ = .72), whereas the latent 
individualism factors were orthogonal in the U.S. sample (Φ = .11) and the vertical 
individualism scale showed low internal consistency in the Chinese sample. The consistency 
coefficients (α) for idiocentrism were .83 and .72, and allocentrism were .80 and .70, 
respectively for the Americans and Chinese. 
 2.4.2 Perceptions of Group Norm. Two questions assessed members’ perceptions of 
group norm: (1) The other people were making choices to maximize the group interest and 
(2) The other people were making choices to maximize their own payoff (reverse-coded). A 
nine-point Likert scale was used (1: strongly disagree; 9: strongly agree). The consistency 
coefficient (α) for this two-item scale was .74 and .67 for the Chinese and American samples, 
respectively.  
 2.4.3 Group Identity.  The Group Identification Scale (GIS: Hinkle et al., 1989) was 
used to measure members' attitudes toward their group.  The consistency coefficient (α) for 
this scale was .76 for the Chinese and .93 for the American samples.  
 2.4.4 Cooperation.  The number of hours participants allocated to the group task (J-
account) was used as the index of cooperation.   
2.5 Measurement Equivalence 
 First of all, we examined the measurement equivalence of the scales of interest 
(idiocentrism, allocentrism, group identity and perceived norm) across the two samples. Prior 
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to the analysis, multi-item composites were created for the idiocentrism, allocentrism and 
group identity scales. Multi-item composites reduce the total number items to a manageable 
level and provide indicators with higher reliability than that of single items (MacCallum, 
Roznowski, & Necowitz, 1992). To test for measurement equivalence, the first step 
involved the fitting of measurement models separately within each of the two samples. This 
step shows the extent to which the indicators represent the underlying latent constructs 
separately within each sample. Table 2 shows that the goodness-of-fit indices obtained for 
measurement models estimated for each sample separately are very satisfactory.  
----- Insert Table 2 about here ----- 
 Next, the measurement model was estimated simultaneously across the two 
groups twice, the first was a multi-sample analysis to establish a baseline of fit, and the 
second imposed an equality constraint on the factor loadings. If the equality constraint 
imposed on the factor loadings results in a significant decrement in the fit indices obtained 
from the baseline model, one cannot argue for measurement invariance.  Table 2 shows the 
fit indices for the baseline as well as the constrained model. It can be seen that the 
invariance constraint on the factor loadings did not result a significant decrement and in 
fact, the constrained model fit the data very well. Therefore, we concluded that the 
constructs had been adequately measured for both samples. 
2.6 Data Analysis 
 As the subjective feelings (group norm, group identity) created through the 
experimental manipulation were the interest of this study, and these as well as cultural 
orientation measures were all continuous variables, we used hierarchical regression analysis 
to test our hypotheses.  We entered the country as a control variable in the first step of the 
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regression.  In the second step, we entered the main effects of group norm, group identity, 
idiocentrism and allocentrism.  In the third step, we entered the interactions between group 
norm, group identity and individual cultural orientations.  All variables were centered 
around their mean to avoid multicollinearity. 
3. Results 
Table 3 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables 
for the combined samples. It can be seen that there is a negative correlation between 
country and allocentrism (r = -.15, p < .01) and a positive correlation between country and 
idiocentrism (r = .41, p < .01), suggesting that Chinese are more allocentric than 
Americans, whereas the Americans are more idiocentric than the Chinese.  The correlation 
between allocentrism and idiocentrism is negative but small (r = -.17, p < .05), suggesting 
that although related, these two constructs are distinct.  Furthermore, the positive 
correlations between familiarity and group norm (r = .28, p < .01) and between familiarity 
and group identity (r = .50, p < .01) suggest that this manipulation induced different levels 
of norm perception and group identity as expected.  The positive correlation between 
Warm-up Interaction and group identity (r = .17, p < .05) also indicates that this 
manipulation indeed evoked different attitudes toward the group among participants. 
----------Insert Table 3 about here-------  
Hypothesis 1a predicted that the relationship between perceived group norm and 
cooperation would be moderated by allocentrism.  Namely, more allocentric persons would 
contribute more hours to the group task when they perceived a more cooperative norm than 
would less allocentric persons.  As shown in Table 4, the two-way interaction (GN x 
Allocentrism) was positive and significant (β = .09, p < .05), providing support for H1a.  .  
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Figure 1 illustrates the form of the interaction. To reveal participants’ behavioral patterns, 
we conducted a two-way ANOVA using median split on allocentrism and perceived group 
norm.  This analysis revealed a significant interaction between the perceived group norm 
and allocentrism (F 1, 596 = 4.32, p < .05).  In particular, we found that when perceiving a 
more cooperative group norm, those scoring high on allocentrism contributed significant 
more hours (mean = 7.50) to the group task than those scoring low on allocentrism (mean = 
6.51), whereas when perceiving a less cooperative group norm, people who score high or 
low on allocentrism did not differ significantly in their contribution (mean = 5.94 and 5.89, 
respectively).   We additionally conducted simple slope tests as recommended by Aiken 
and West (1991). These tests involved estimating the slope of the relationship between 
group norm and individual cooperation at high and low levels (one standard deviation 
above and below the mean) of the postulated moderator variable (i.e., allocentrism). The 
tests revealed that group norm was positively related to cooperation for individuals scoring 
high on allocentrism (β = .32, p < .001), but no significant relationship was found for 
individuals low on allocentrism (β = .08, n.s.).    
----- Insert Table 4 and Figure 1 about here ----- 
Hypothesis 1b predicted that the relationship between perceived group norm and 
cooperation would be moderated by idiocentrism.  Specifically, more idiocentric persons 
would contribute fewer hours to the group task when perceiving a more cooperative norm 
than would less idiocentric persons.  It can be seen from Table 4 that the two-way 
interaction (GN x Idiocentrism) was negative and significant (β = -.15, p < .01), providing 
support for H1b.  We conducted a two-way ANOVA using median split on idiocentrism 
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and perceived group norm and found that the interaction between these two variables was 
significant (F 1, 603 = 10.8, p < .01).  As can be seen from Figure 2, when perceiving a 
more cooperative norm, people scoring high on idiocentrism contributed significantly fewer 
hours (mean = 6.67) to the group task than those who scored low on idiocentrism (mean = 
7.40), supporting our hypothesis.  Furthermore, mirroring the findings on high allocentrics 
persons, we found that low idiocentrics contributed more hours when perceiving a more 
cooperative norm (mean = 7.40) than when perceiving a less cooperative norm (mean = 
5.52).  On the other hand, the analysis reveals that the changes between the contribution 
made by the highly idiocentrics under the high versus low group norm condition is minimal 
(6.67 vs. 6.26), suggesting that idiocentrics are not very susceptible to normative influence. 
The simple slope analyses also indicated that group norm was positively related to 
cooperation for individuals scoring low on idiocentrism (β = .35, p < .001), but not related 
for individuals high on idiocentrism (β = .08, n.s.).    
----- Insert Figure 2 about here ----- 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the relationship between group identity and cooperation 
would be moderated by idiocentrism but not by allocentrism.  As shown in Table 4, 
contrary to our expectations, we found that the two-way interaction between group identity 
and idiocentrism was positive but not significant (β = .07, n.s.). The interaction between 
group identity and allocentrism was not significant either (β = .02, n.s.).  These results 
suggest that the positive relationship between group identity and cooperation seem to 
sustain regardless of participants’ individual cultural orientation.   
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Finally, in order to ensure that the results obtained were not a function of social 
norms within each country and were attributable to the individual difference variables of 
interest, the regressions were repeated separately for each country. The trends observed in 
these analyses largely supported the results reported above. Although not as many 
interactions were significant this time, it is very likely that this is due to the relatively 
smaller sample sizes. As proposed, the interactions between idiocentrism and group norms 
were found to be negative for both countries, but were not statistically significant.  While 
insignificant for the Chinese sample, allocentrism positively moderated the relationship 
between group norms and cooperation for the US sample (β = .14, p < .05). In both 
countries as well as the combined sample, the interaction between idiocentrism and group 
identity was positive as predicted, but not significant. Finally, as proposed, no moderating 
effect of allocentrism was observed for the relationship between group identity and 
cooperation across the board. 
4. Discussion 
 The main purpose of this study was to explore how the effects of group norm and 
group identity on cooperation in a public goods dilemma are influenced by individual 
cultural orientations of idiocentrism and allocentrism.  Our results show that more 
allocentric persons contribute more to the public good when perceiving a cooperative group 
norm than do less allocentric persons.  On the other hand, more idiocentric persons 
contribute less to the public good when perceiving a cooperative group norm than do less 
idiocentric persons.  These results provide a more complete yet complicated picture on how 
norms influence individual behavior than what we initially theorized.  First, it appears that 
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more allocentric persons are not just always cooperating in group situations, rather, they 
distinguish between more and less cooperative norms and are only more likely to comply 
when the norm is more cooperative.  This finding is remarkably similar to Chatman and 
Barsade’s (1995) observation that while allocentrics tended to cooperate more in 
collectivistic organizations (i.e., when they perceive cooperative norms to prevail), they 
significantly decreased cooperation behaviors when the organization culture was 
manipulated to be endorsing individualistic norms. It appears that allocentrics are highly 
sensitive to social cues and their behavior is much dependent on the situational norms. 
 Second, while our results support the notion that idiocentrics tend to behave in a 
way that maximizes personal outcomes at the expense of the group, it is also very 
interesting to note that the behavior of idiocentric individuals is somewhat aloof to the 
situation.  Our results show that, for high idiocentrics, there is little difference in 
cooperation between those who perceived a more cooperative norm (mean = 6.67) and 
those who perceived a less cooperative norm (mean = 6.26).  This result seems to echo 
what van Lange (1999) proposed as the “integrative model of social value orientation” in 
which he suggested that proselfs do not engage much in reciprocal cooperation and do not 
react strongly to feedback about the behavior of others.  One explanation for such 
insensitivity to situation cues is that more idiocentric persons do not rely on the normative 
information in their decision making process but focus more on their personal goals.   
 Finally, similar to our results with respect to allocentrism, idiocentrism was not a 
significant moderator on the relationship between group identity and cooperation. These 
results suggest that group identity is not strongly influenced by cultural orientations but 
perhaps should be viewed as an important condition for cooperation across populations with 
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diverse cultural orientations. This is in contrast to the influence of group norms in predicting 
cooperative behavior, which appears to be more culture-bound.  Interestingly, the recent meta-
analysis by Oyserman et al. (2002) shows that when allocentrism is operationalized as 
relationality (i.e., feeling close to the members of the group, enjoying being with them), the 
difference between idiocentric and allocentric samples disappears. Yet, when feelings of 
obligation towards the group and concerns for in-group harmony are contrasted, the difference 
between allocentrics and idiocentrics emerges. These observations are in line with our results, 
which also support the cultural salience of group norms and the universality of group identity.    
 This study contributes to the social dilemma literature in several important ways.  
First, it directly tested the group norm hypothesis that was proposed to explain the robust 
communication effects.  We found the relationship between group norm and cooperation in 
the public goods dilemma to be complex and culture-bound.  Second, this study provides 
additional evidence as how group identity might influence cooperation across cultural 
contexts. These findings not only enrich and deepen our understandings about the effects of 
group/social norm and identity on individual behavior, but also help to develop more 
advanced theories in explaining individual cooperation in situations where people face conflict 
between maximizing personal interest and maximizing collective interest.  
 Finally, this study introduces an individual-level cultural variable into the social 
dilemma study, which extends the scope of the social dilemma research by examining the 
cultural influence on individual cooperative decision-making. With majority of the social 
dilemma research not examining the cultural effect and majority of the cross-cultural research 
not examining individual cooperative decision-making in the social dilemma context, this 
study fills the void.  Moreover, since cultural influence can be studied at the individual, group 
